Household and Individual Decision-Making Over the Life Cycle: A First Look at Evidence from Peruvian Cohorts by Jaime Saavedra-Chanduví & Martin Valdivia
Inter-American Development Bank
Banco Interamericano de Desarrollo
Latin American Research Network
Red de Centros de Investigación
Research Network Working paper #R-425
Household and Individual Decision-Making
over the Life Cycle: A First Look at




*Grupo de Análisis para el Desarrollo
** Grupo de Análisis para el Desarrollo,
Centro de Investigación y Docencia Económicas
November 2000ii




Household and individual decision-making over the life cycle : a first look at
evidence from Peruvian cohorts / by Jaime Saavedra, Martín Valdivia.
p. cm.   (Research Network working papers ; R-425)
Includes bibliographical references.
1.  Family--Peru--Decision making.  2. Family--Peru--Economic aspects.  3. Family--Peru--
Social aspects.    I. Valdivia, Martín.    II. Inter-American Development Bank. Research




1300 New York Avenue, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20577
The views and interpretations in this document are those of the authors and should not be
attributed to the Inter-American Development Bank, or to any individual acting on its
behalf.
The Research Department (RES) publishes the Latin American Economic Policies
Newsletter, as well as working papers and books, on diverse economic issues. To obtain a
complete list of RES publications, and read or download them please visit our web site at:
http://www.iadb.org/res/32.htmiii
         Abstract
1
Peruvian society has achieved significant improvements in terms of lower fertility and
mortality over the last forty years, which has brought down population growth rates to less
than 1.2% a year. These improvements have led, on average, to a demographic transition
with lower dependency ratios. In general, this transition increases the ability of the society
to take proper care of its non-working population groups, children and the elderly, which
may be reflected in changes in household structure.
We identify stylized facts about the implications of these changes at the micro level
through the use of pseudo-panels from household-level data for Peru. We calculate age,
cohort and year effects for variables related to household structure, educational attainment,
labor force participation and savings.
We find some evidence that suggests differences, by educational level, in the
Peruvian demographic transition. Household size is smaller for the younger cohorts in all
households but those with less educated heads. We argue that these different profiles are
explained by the fact that reductions in fertility have not reached the less educated. On the
one hand, these differences in household size patterns are similar to those in the number of
children. On the other hand, cohort patterns in family living arrangements—i.e., households
with extended families—are similar across educational groups.
However, family living arrangements change throughout the life cycle, in the sense
that extended families are more common for households with very young (under 25) and
elderly (over 60) heads. These changes in family arrangements over the life cycle add
confusion to the meaning of headship, since in some cases the household reports as its head
the older member and in other cases the main income earner.
We also find that younger cohorts are more educated, are larger than older ones, and
show lower returns to education. This is consistent with an increase in relative supply of
educated workers that outpaces the increase in relative demand induced by economic
growth, under the assumption of imperfect substitutability between equally educated
workers of different cohorts.
Finally, we show that intergenerational family arrangements over the life cycle limit
the ability of the life cycle hypothesis (LCH) to explain household savings behavior. We
find evidence that Peruvian households, especially the less educated, smooth consumption
over the life cycle, not only through the typical saving-dissaving mechanism, but also by
smoothing income. Net cash transfers, or living arrangements between parents and their
offspring, play an important role in this income smoothing.
                                                
1 This study has been undertaken as part of the IADB Regional Research Center Network project “A Dynamic
Analysis of Household Decision-Making in Latin America: Changes in Household Structure, Female Labor
Force Participation, Human Capital and its Returns.”  This version has benefited from helpful comments by
Orazio Attanasio, Miguel Székely, and all participants in the IADB workshop that took place in Mexico, D.F.
in March 1999. The authors also acknowledge valuable research assistance by Tami Aritomi and Eduardo
Maruyama. The usual disclaimers apply.iv1.  Introduction
Countries all over the world have moved from a relatively high fertility-high mortality
scenario towards a low fertility-low mortality scenario over the twentieth century.
2 At
different times and paces, they have all moved in that direction, although huge differences
remain. Industrialized countries, for instance, currently enjoy an average life expectancy of
75 years, and a fertility rate of about 2 children per woman (UNICEF, 1995, 1996). Four
decades ago, these countries already had a life expectancy of 68 years and a fertility rate of
2.6, figures most of the developing world have not reached even during the 1990s, despite
spectacular advances in many developing countries.
How do these demographic changes affect the social and economic performance of
a country? A direct demographic effect is the change in the age composition of the
population. With high fertility and high mortality, population grows faster and each new
generation is larger than the previous one, resulting in a very young population.
3 Later, as
fertility falls, and lower mortality implies that more people live longer, the population ages.
Consequently, we move from a high children dependency rate towards a high elderly
dependency rate. The demographic transition is characterized as a situation in which
reductions in the number of newborn outweigh the increments in the number of the elderly,
and this happens because the latter are a very small portion of the population at the
beginning of the process. During the transition, though, total dependency rate, the sum of
the two, is lower.
During the first stage, the most critical issue is how to deal with children, for
instance, in terms of investments in their nutrition, health, and education. During the
demographic transition, the total dependency rate is relatively low and resources can be
used to improve the welfare of all the population. As the final stage approaches, the issues
move towards how society will manage to sustain the elderly. This is a particularly
                                                
2 Generally, though, the decline in mortality rates has preceded the decline in fertility rates by several
decades.
3 Actually, if infant mortality is too large, or life expectancy is too low, in a country, then lower mortality
means more children or more women living all the way through her fertile years. Thus, at very high mortality,
reductions in mortality might actually imply a younger population. This effect does reduce the effect of
mortality on aging but it is not that important at the current level of development of most countries.2
important challenge in the future of developing countries considering that the proportion of
the population under any kind of formal pension system is not that high.
The demographic transition does not only affect the patterns of inter-generational
transfers (see Duryea and Székely, 1998), but also intra-household production, investment
and consumption strategies. With lower fertility rates, households on average might have
more resources per child, and that might result in higher investments per child in education,
for instance. Also, as women have to devote less time to child rearing activities, they might
also invest more in their education and participate more in the labor market.
An important issue in developing countries is that, in the absence of an efficient
public system of social security, households have implemented social networks to reduce
the effect of shocks and care for dependent family members. These social networks make it
possible to implement inter-generational transfers in the form of cash, or they may imply
changes in household structure (Subbarao et al., 1995). For instance, family arrangements
may include mechanisms such as the junction of two families in one household. A young
married couple might decide to live with their parents in order to offer proper care to their
offspring. Alternatively, elderly parents might join their children’s household so that they
can support them during his/her retirement years. An important question, less treated in the
literature, is how these arrangements would be affected by the demographic transition
described above.
The goal of this paper is to identify the stylized facts of the Peruvian demographic
transition and of its differentiated effects by level of education. We focus on the analysis of
changes in household structure, investments in education, female labor force participation,
returns to education and savings. For this purpose we use four nationwide household
surveys (Peruvian Living Standards Measurement Surveys—PLSMS) applied in 1985,
1991, 1994 and 1997. We do not use the small panel that could be constructed with those
databases, but instead construct a pseudo-panel by following each cohort over time.
Differences across cohorts are the ones more directly related to the demographic transition,
so that we need to identify them separately from the age and year effects that come with the
data. Nevertheless, while doing so, we also analyze the life cycle patterns in the variables
under analysis, which provide important additional insights.3
The rest of the document is organized as follows. Section 2 locates the Peruvian
demographic transition, in terms of fertility and infant mortality, vis-a-vis the process in the
rest of the world, in particular, East Asian countries and the rest of Latin America. Next,
Section 3 discusses the nature of the age, cohort and year effects, as well as the
identification problem, and presents the identification strategy proposed in this document,
which is based on Heckman and Robb (1995). Section 4 describes the construction of the
database used in this study, that is, the general characteristics of the constructed pseudo-
panel. Sections 5-7 discuss the findings of this study in terms of the age and cohort effects
for household structure, individual educational attainment and performance in the labor
market (labor force participation and returns to education) and household savings. Section 8
concludes with a summary of findings and some final remarks.
2.  The Demographic Transition in Peru
The demographic transition experienced by a country or a group of countries over time can
be described by a number of indicators such as fertility, infant mortality, life expectancy,
and population growth, among others. Here, we use the evolution of fertility and infant
mortality to locate the Peruvian demographic transition in relation to those in other parts of
the world.
Figure 1 shows that the fertility rate in Peru has dropped from 6.8 children per
woman in the early 1960s to 3.4 in the early 1990s. This transition was similar to the
average in Latin America and East Asia and the Pacific, although fertility in Peru was
slightly higher in the 1960s. The reduction in fertility in industrialized and transition
economies was smaller, but their levels in the 1960s were already small (2.9 and 3.5,
respectively). On the other hand, countries in the Middle East, Africa, and South Asia are
still behind in the demographic transition process, with higher fertility rates in the 1990s
and smaller observed changes during the last three decades.4
Figure 1. Global Fertility Rate, 1963-1993
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Note: Regional averages are unweighted averages of country-level data.
Figure 2 shows that infant mortality in Peru also fell significantly between the early
1960s and the early 1990s.  In 1960, 140 infants died out of every 1,000 live births. That
number has dropped to 42 in 1996. As in the case of fertility, this transition is similar to
that of the average in Latin America and East Asia and the Pacific, although in the 1960s
mortality rates in Peru were higher than the Latin American average and approaching those
in Southeast Asia. Industrialized and transition economies are ahead in the demographic
transition, while African, Middle Eastern and South Asian countries remain significantly
behind.5
Figure 2. Infant Mortality Rate, 1963-1993
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Reductions in mortality have actually affected all age groups resulting in higher life
expectancy at birth. In Peru, life expectancy for males has increased from 57 to 60 years
over the last 20 years. The corresponding figures for females are 66 and 71 (see WHO,
1999). With life expectancy for Peruvian females already above fertile years, further
improvements will indeed imply aging of the Peruvian population.
Overall, the Peruvian demographic transition seems to be very similar in timing and
speed to that of East Asian and Pacific countries. This result is interesting in the sense that
several studies have recently focused on the effects of these changes over the social and
economic behavior of individuals and families in countries of that region such as Taiwan
(Lee et al., 1998; Deaton and Paxson, 1993, 1998). The main difference between Peru and
Taiwan is the respective growth rates of their economies during the period of analysis.
While Taiwan experienced very high growth rates over the last four decades, the Peruvian
economy displayed, by the end of the 1990s, a level of per capita GDP similar to that of
twenty years before. The lack of growth may imply different effects of the demographic
transition on dynamic economic behavior by Peruvian households.6
The observed changes in fertility and mortality generate a change in the age
structure of the population. According to the last two National Censuses the proportion of
young people has started to diminish. As shown in Table 1, the proportion of children under
15 years old fell from 38.6% to 34% between 1981 and 1993. Meanwhile, the proportion of
people over 60 years old increased from 5.6% to 6.8% in the same period. Consequently,
the Peruvian population is already aging. Even if the reduction in the size of younger
cohorts implies a reduction in supply pressures in the labor market, the increase in the
proportion of older workers will imply a serious burden on younger cohorts. Moreover,
people who in the 1990s were 50 years or older have their pensions tied to the old pay-as-
you-go system and have higher life expectancy rates.
Table 1. Basic Demographic Indicators
1981 1993 1981 1993 1981 1993
  Total population (in thousands) 8515 11092 8489 10956 17005 22048
  % of children (<=15) 40.7 36.2 41.8 37.8 41.2 37.0
  % of adults (16-60) 53.0 56.6 52.4 55.4 52.7 56.0
  % of old people (>60) 6.3 7.2 5.8 6.8 6.1 7.0
  Youth dependency ratio
* ---- ---- ---- ---- 0.78 0.66
  Elderly dependecy ratio
** ---- ---- ---- ---- 0.11 0.13
Source: Peru's Living Standards Measurement Studies Household Surveys 1985, 1991, 1994 & 1997.
*  Number of children / Number of adults
** Number of old people / Number of adults
Census data
Female Male Total
With these figures, the youth dependency ratio (ratio of people with less than 14
years with respect to the working age population, between 15 and 65) fell from 0.78 to 0.66
according to the Census. The old age dependency ratio, the ratio of those aged more than 65
to the working age population-shows a downward trend, both in the Census—from 11.5%
to 12.6%—and using the LSMS data.
Before the analysis of the changes in household structure, labor force participation,
educational attainment, returns to schooling, and savings in Peru, we discuss the nature of
the age, cohort and year effects at hand, and describe the strategy followed to identify them
separately in each case.7
3.  Disentangling Age, Cohort and Year Effects
As indicated in the previous section, the idea in this paper is to infer the life cycle path and
cohort differences for variables such as household size, educational attainment, labor force
participation, returns to education and savings. It is clear that we cannot obtain cohort and
life cycle (age) effects from a cross-section of individuals or households, since in that case
we observe each generation at a certain age. A panel would be the best case, since we
observe each individual at different ages, although we still need to consider that part of the
differences across cohorts may be explained by differences in the characteristics of the
individuals. The issue is more complicated here since the data available (LSMS) is not a
panel but four repeated cross-sections (1985-86, 1991, 1994 and 1997). In what follows, we
first describe the factors that are understood to be behind the age-cohort and year effects,
and then explain the strategy followed to identify them depending on the characteristics of
the variable.
3.1 Understanding the Age, Cohort and Year Effects
The age effect is associated with varying abilities or preferences of individuals over the life
cycle. For instance, we would expect a hump shape profile for individual log income over
the life cycle. Initially, log income increases with productivity as a result of accumulated
experience. The marginal increase diminishes the more experienced the individual, and as
the individual ages he may lose some of his ability to perform certain activities.
Consequently, at a certain age, income may start to decrease with age, retirement being the
consolidation of such a process. In the case of the labor force participation of females over
the life cycle, fertility decisions are identified as crucial in the expected nature of age
effects.
The identification of the cohort effect is more subtle. The more direct components
of the cohort effect refer to behavioral changes, such as those of females from younger
cohorts who tend to stay longer in school, have fewer children and work more. For
productivity or earnings, the empirical literature for developed countries seems to relate the
cohort effect with aggregate factors that affect certain cohorts relatively more. Examples of
such factors include:8
i)  demographic changes affecting the cohort’s size. The idea is that labor markets for
different cohorts are not totally integrated, so individuals that belong to larger cohorts
may face more competition, which may have a negative effect over earnings (MaCurdy
and Mroz, 1995) This factor has been particularly important in the case of the American
baby boom, but also in developing countries with an important rural-urban migration
process.
ii)  differences in the access and quality of productivity-enhancing public and private
goods. Access and quality of education and health services and nutritional standards
during childhood may vary across cohorts as a result of changes in public investments in
human capital, or in the economic welfare of the previous generation. Differences in
education, health and nutritional investments can permanently affect the productivity of
individuals (Deaton and Paxson, 1993). In the case of Peru, migration to urban areas and
the deterioration in the quality of public education and health services would play an
important role in the determination of cohort effects among Peruvian households.
Finally, year effects generally capture macroeconomic effects that condition the
income generating capabilities of all individuals and households. For the Peruvian data
used here, this effect is particularly important since a major long recession occurred
between 1985 and 1994. In that sense, the data of 1991 implies lower income and
expenditures for all households.
3.2 Identifying Age, Cohort and Year Effects
We first discuss here the simplest case, the one in which there are none or negligible age
and year effects. That would be the case, for instance, of educational attainment by adult
individuals, considering that formal schooling is normally pursued during the first 25
years.
4 We may assume, then, that for individuals older than 25 years old there will not be
further changes in educational attainment. Consequently, for these types of variables, we
can concentrate on the cohort differences without any concern for age and year effects.
                                                
4 Excluding training activities that usually continue through adulthood. College education might also continue
after that age, but the size of that group is negligible in the sample.9
The second case is that of variables that would arguably have age and cohort
effects, but negligible year effects. For instance, differences in the number of children
among women may come as a result of age differences, since fertility years go from, say,
12 years to about 45 years old, but also as a result of fertility decisions associated with
differences in information and preferences across cohorts. Although the timing of births
may be affected by the economic situation of the family in a particular year, that would
arguably be less true for the number of children.
What we can do in that case is to mimic a panel by following the different cohorts
over the years. By pooling the individuals who were born in 1975, as well as those who
were 20 years old in 1985, we can follow the same cohort when they are 26 in 1991, 29 in
1994 and 31 in 1997. We can do the same for the individuals born in 1974, who are 21 in
1985, and so on. Then, we can plot the cohort averages on the age of the individual. This
kind of plot does indeed reveal important information on the life cycle path of the variable
of interest as has been shown extensively in the literature. (see, for instance, Browning,
Deaton and Irish, 1985). Formally, we can obtain the age and cohort effects by running a
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where D
a and D
c are vectors of dummies identifying the age group and cohort, respectively,
to which the individual or household head belongs.
The issue is that the life cycle path obtained this way is somewhat distorted by the
simultaneous presence of cohort and year effects, which may be very important for
variables such as labor force participation, returns to schooling, or household savings. In
order to estimate a clean life cycle path, we need to control for these other effects.
However, that correction is not that simple because of an identification problem that we
describe below.
The Identification Problem
The empirical identification of age, cohort and year effects has been vastly discussed in the
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where D
a and D
c are defined as in (1), and D
t is a vector of dummies identifying the year in
which the household was interviewed. The identification problem is associated with the fact
that the three effects are linearly dependent; that is, once we know the cohort to which the
individual (household head) belongs and the year in which he/she was interviewed, we also
know exactly his/her age  c t a   .
A popular solution to this identification problem is to restrict the year effects  t  .
Work by Deaton and Paxson (1993) and Attanasio (1998), for example, forces the year
effects sum to zero and to be orthogonal to deterministic trends.
5 By doing that, we
guarantee that any deterministic time trend would be attributed to age and cohort effects
and not to time. The limitation of this approach is that it does not make any specific use of
all the available information about the nature of age, cohort or year effects for the different
variables under analysis. In what follows, we discuss the strategies followed to identify
these effects for the variables of interest.
The Proposed Identification Strategy
Business cycle fluctuations are the most common source of the year effect associated with
variables such as labor force participation, returns to schooling and savings. Peruvian and
international empirical literature presents clear evidence on the procyclical nature of
fluctuations in these variables. For the Peruvian case, the procyclicality of labor force
participation is documented in Terrones and Calderón (1993) and in Saavedra (1998).
Saavedra and Maruyama (1999) also report evidence of procyclical fluctuations in returns
to education.
In this sense, it could be argued that the year effect is closely related to the
evolution of per capita GDP. If per capita GDP has a trend over the period of analysis, the
incorporation of this information may generate estimated age and cohort effects
significantly different from those obtained using the identification restriction of Deaton and
                                                
5 Actually, Attanasio’s procedure is slightly different from that derived from (2), since he assumes a specific
functional form for the age effect, a five-degree polynomial on age. See also Attanasio and Székely (1998).11
Paxson (1993) and Attanasio (1998). Heckman and Robb (1995) show that the latent
variable model would provide an appropriate framework to operationalize the inclusion of
this type of information. We could first generalize (2) as follows,
 t c a M E P t c a y    , ,( 3 )
where Pa denotes the age effect, Ec denotes the cohort effect, and Mt denotes the year effect,
which are assumed to be linearly dependent. Although all these effects are actually
unobservable, we may know their functional form, say, those in (4)-(6).
 a a a a Z f P     ;( 4 )
 c c c c Z g E     ;( 5 )
 t t t t Z h M     ;( 6 )
where Za , Zc , and Zt denote the vectors of observable variables that affect the age, cohort
and year effects, respectively.  t c a    , ,  are the error terms associated with unobservable
variables or measurement error,    t c a j Z E j j , ,    , 0 /    , and      ´ E . Since we do not
observe the age-cohort-year effects, we cannot run the regressions in (4)-(6). What we can
do, though, is to replace them in (3) and estimate the reduced form equation. We do that
here by specifying the functional forms for the three effects as presented in (4´)-(6´):
a
a
a a D P     (4´)
c
c
c c D E     (5´)
t t t t Y M     (6´)
where Yt is the log per capita GDP for year t. That is, we assume no specific functional
form nor specific observable variable associated with the year and cohort effects. We do
solve the identification problem in (2) by assuming that the log of per capita GDP is a good
proxy for the year effect. Then, we estimate the age and cohort effects by running the
following regression:
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where  t c a act        .12
We use this particular identification strategy but add more structure to the
econometric models to control for certain important other effects. For instance, the age and
cohort effects for family size and savings are obtained by estimating a variant of (7) that
considers differences across levels of education (3 in the case or urban households and 2 in
the case of rural households). We also allow for different year effects, as approximated by
the log per capita GDP, depending on the nature of the “centro poblado” (urban/rural). The
estimation of age and cohort effects for the returns to schooling adds additional controls,
such as individual experience, among others.
Another issue is that, for certain variables, the relevant unit of analysis is not the
individual but the household. That would be the case, for instance, for savings. In such a
case, we can use the age and cohort of the household head as reference, but such a solution
is affected by household formation decisions over the life cycle. Changes in household size
as a result of the birth of a child, or the moving away of an older son/daughter as a result of
marriage, can potentially affect the life cycle path. This issue is addressed later where
necessary.
4.  The PLSMS Pseudo-Panel
We first pool the four cross-section surveys at both individual and household level,
considering that the unit of analysis would vary according to the nature of the variable
under consideration. Then, we stratify the data based on age, cohort, education and gender.
First, we defined the interval for the age and cohort groups to be 5 years, partly based on
the limitations of the sample size but also on the length of the time interval between
surveys. We distinguish three educational levels: up to six years of schooling (primary
school—educ = 0), up to 11 years of schooling (secondary school—educ = 1), and with
more than 11 years of schooling (at least some post-secondary school—educ = 2). For the
household-level pool, the sample is stratified based on the characteristics of the self-
reported household head.13
Cohort Age in 1985 Educ = 0 Educ = 1 Educ = 2 Peru
1 20-24 208 326 95 629
2 25-29 358 447 216 1,021
3 30-34 478 718 315 1,511
4 35-39 719 665 330 1,714
5 40-44 795 552 304 1,651
6 45-49 873 378 250 1,501
7 50-54 1,006 313 161 1,480
8 55-59 945 252 110 1,307
9 60-64 710 189 106 1,005
10 65-69 542 135 65 742
11 70-74 388 69 24 481
12 75-79 214 36 19 269
Total 7,236 4,080 1,995 13,311
Table 2ª. Sample Size by Cohort and Level of Education
Household Level Pseudo-Panel—PLSMS 1985, 91, 94 and 97
The household-level pool has been restricted to “normal” households. In that sense,
we excluded one-person households and households with single heads. It is usually argued
that this type of households will not necessarily fit the typical behavior pattern assumed for
the LCH (see, for instance, Attanasio and Browning, 1995). Still, we included households
whose heads had a present partner, even when they were not married, as well as households
with widowed, divorced or separated heads. Also, we decided to keep households with
heads employed as independent workers. These households have often been excluded
because it is difficult to separate the expenses of the household as a firm from the
household’s consumption. Nevertheless, had we excluded this group, our sample size
would have been reduced too much, limiting our ability to differentiate our analysis by
levels of education.
The other discriminating criterion was the age of the household head. Generally, it
is argued that households with heads approaching retirement change their saving patterns
away from the life cycle motive. We decided to limit the analysis to cohorts 79 years of age
or younger in 1985. After all these discrimination procedures, the sample is reduced to a
total of 13,311 observations, distributed in twelve five-year cohorts as follows:14
Cohort Age in 1985 Educ = 0 Educ = 1 Educ = 2 Peru
1 15-20 1,496 3,153 1,148 5,797
2 20-24 1,267 2,247 1,208 4,722
3 25-29 1,255 1,785 985 4,025
4 30-34 1,523 1,342 744 3,609
5 35-39 1,531 969 508 3,008
6 40-44 1,539 612 375 2,526
7 45-49 1,647 492 244 2,383
8 50-54 1,471 379 156 2,006
9 55-59 1,180 294 150 1,624
10 60-64 888 215 91 1,194
11 65-+ 1,650 227 84 1,961
Total 15,447 11,715 5,693 32,855
Table 2b. Sample Size by Cohort and Level of Education
Individual Level Pseudo-Panel—PLSMS 1985, 91, 94 and 97
5.  Household Structure Decisions
We analyze here the age and cohort patterns of household size and age composition, as well
as other important household decisions. In particular, we analyze the household decision to
host more than one nuclear family, and in that case, the decision on who is reported as the
head of the household.
5.1  Household Size
We can imagine that changes in family size can hardly be associated with year effects.
Aggregate shocks may indeed generate changes in the number and age composition of
household members, but that would probably not occur on a year-to-year basis. In that
sense, the figure with the age-cohort averages would show the life cycle pattern rather
clearly, and the vertical differences between line segments would be related to cohort
effects.
The first panel in Figure 3 shows that family size grows sharply with age until the
household head is around 42 years old, and from then on it starts to fall. Education plays a
significant role in explaining family size patterns. Heads with primary education have
larger families than heads with secondary education, which in turn have larger families than
college-educated workers. Less educated heads have more children and earlier in their lives
when compared with more educated heads. Family size for the former reaches a peak of15
about 7 members at age 43. For the more educated, the peak is reached slightly later, and it
is of only 6 members.
























































Although we can see from Figure 3 that cohort effects are non-negligible, it is rather
difficult to measure their magnitude. To better observe them, we assume that year effects
are unimportant for this variable. Following the general methodology in Section 3.2, we
estimated the following regression for each educational level:16
   
ii
i i i i C A FS 2 1 0    (8)
where FS = Family size
Ai = Age dummies
Ci = Cohort dummies.
Figure 4 shows the estimated age and cohort profiles for household size. First,
notice that the estimated age effects in the left panel are very close to the profiles described
above from the averages in Figure 3. The cohort effects are shown in the right panel of
Figure 4. They indicate a clear decreasing trend in household size among the households
with more educated heads; that is, younger cohorts tend to live in smaller households. This
result is consistent with the important reductions observed in the aggregate fertility rate.
Nevertheless, it is rather surprising to find that households whose heads have at most
primary education present an increasing pattern. Since the LSMS does not include the
history of pregnancy and births by women, we are not able to identify to which extent this
pattern corresponds to changes in fertility, or the lack thereof. Alternatively, we can think
that younger cohorts live in larger households because they tend more to live with extended
families. This issue is addressed indirectly in the next sub-section, when looking at the age
composition of the household members.
Figure 4. Age and Cohort Effect on family Size by Educational Level
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5.2  Children and Elderly in the Household
According to the LSMS data, the average number of children per household is the largest if
the head has only primary education (1.0) and lowest if he/she has university education
(0.7). Trying to analyze the age composition patterns for household members through the
life cycle and across cohorts, we go directly to the regression analysis, based on the
similarities already observed between the age effects in Figures 3 and 4. Using the same
regression methodology as in household size, we analyzed life cycle and cohort patterns for
the number of young children (0 to five years old), older children (6 to 15 years old) and
the elderly (60 years or older).
Figure 5 shows that the number of children peaks between the age of 25 and 30 and
falls monotonically. Differences across levels of education are observed at young ages, with
primary and secondary educated workers having more young children in their twenties.
After the thirties, all education groups have roughly the same average number of young
children. Regarding cohorts, there are important differences among younger cohorts. While
for secondary and primary educated workers the number of young children is stable or
increases the younger is the cohort, for university-educated workers there is a clear
downward trend.
Figure 5. Household Demographics by Educational Level, Age and Cohort Effects
5.a. Proportion of children (less than 6 years old)
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5.b. Proportion of children (6-15 years old)
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Source: 1985, 1991 & 1997 Peruvian LSMS Household Surveys Source: 1985, 1991 & 1997 Peruvian LSMS Household Surveys
Regarding children aged 6 to 15, the life cycle peak is in the early forties. The life
cycle pattern for families with college-educated heads is clearly below the other groups and
with a peak at a later age. The cohort analysis reveals a clear reduction in the number of
teenagers in educated families and a stable pattern among the less educated, consistent with
the findings regarding household size.
These results would still be consistent with the idea that the cohort differences
observed in household size among the less educated would be at least partially explained by
differences in the number of children, a variable closely connected to fertility trends. We
now proceed to see what are the trends for household with extended families.
5.3  Types of Households
As shown in Table 3 more than half of Peruvian households are made up by couples with
children (nuclear households), while extended households (couples or single parents with or
without children that live with relatives) represent around 35% of Peruvian households
6.
Little more than a third of those households do not have children.
                                                
6 Extended families are those in which, in addition to the parent or parents and children younger than 24, there
is an additional family member. Note that a son that is older than 24 and live with his /her parents is
considered from an extended family.19
Table 3.  Household-Level and Individual-Level Structure by Household Type
*
1985 1991 1994 1997 1985 1991 1994 1997
  Couple with children 55.8 56.5 52.9 54.5 56 56 52.7 53.5
  Single father with children 1.3 0.9 1 0.7 1.1 0.5 0.7 0.5
  Single mother with children 4.8 4.7 3.7 3.5 3.5 3.7 2.7 2.6
  Couple without children 2.1 2.1 2 1.9 0.7 0.8 0.7 0.7
  Extended families 34.1 35.3 39 38.3 36.4 38.4 41.6 41.5
    Couple or single parent with children plus other relatives 23.9 24.8 25.4 26.5 28.6 30.4 30.6 31.8
    Head or couple without children plus other relatives 10.2 10.5 13.6 11.8 7.8 8 11 9.7
  Other 1.9 0.6 1.3 1 2.4 0.6 1.5 1.1
Source: 1985, 1991, 1994 & 1997 Peruvian LSMS Household Surveys.
*
Household-level structure Individual-level structure
Figure 6 shows the proportion of nuclear and extended households along the life
cycle. It suggests that people increase their probability of living in an extended household
from their early twenties and until their mid thirties, when it is more likely that older
children stay with their parents and bring their own offspring to their parents’ home. The
likelihood of living with relatives increases again as heads approach their fifties, as they
start to live with their children’s families. If the head’s children just left the household to
form a new family, there would be no obvious reason for a clear increase in the proportion
of extended families as the head grows older. The observed pattern reveals that, in many
cases, as the head ages, his/her children bring their own families to the household instead of
leaving their parents. Alternatively, older parents stay with their children as a way of
surviving.20
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We also analyze life cycle and cohort effects using a probit regression for the
probability of being an extended family, including age and cohort dummies in the
specification. As shown in Figure 7, there is an increase in the probability of constituting an
extended family for 25 to 35-year-old individuals, and then there is a monotonic increase of
the probability that reaches its peak at age 55. That is, these adjustments in household
structure seem to be very important early and late in the life cycle of the head. The cohort
effect shows a clear decreasing pattern for those born after the mid-forties, with no
important differences between education groups. This similarity indicates that these types
of adjustments in household structure cannot be behind the constancy of family size among
the less educated younger cohorts, as reported in the previous section. It supports the notion
that such constancy is related to the fact that the number of children is stable across these
cohorts. Introducing demographic and other controls does not affect the shape of the age or
cohort profiles.21






















































































Table 4 shows who are the “other relatives” in extended families. Notice that these
percentages do not need to add up to 100%, as there can be more than one “other relative”
in the household (an older son and his wife, for example). Around 50% of the extended
families have their old (24 or older) son or daughter in the household. The number of
grandchildren is also important, rising to 40% in 1994, followed by parents or parents in
law.
Table 4. Who are the “Other Relatives” in Extended Families?
1985 1991 1994 1997
  Son / Daughter 39 49 52 47
  Son in law / Daughter in law 14 11 16 17
  Grandchildren 35 29 42 41
  Parents / Parents in law 21 27 20 23
  Other relatives 33 29 24 25
Source: 1985, 1991, 1994 & 1997 Peruvian LSMS Household Surveys.
*
5.4  Who is the Boss?
The previous analysis relies on the self-identification of the head of the household,
considering that he/she is the one leading the decision process within the household. This
assumption would be particularly harmless if the self-reported head is at the same time the22
main income earner. This need not be the case here, considering that Peruvian households
tend to host extended families, as shown in the previous section. Extended families tend to
host adults other than the head and his/her spouse. Figure 8 shows clearly the increasing
pattern of this type of members over the life cycle. The question is whether the older male
or female adult remains as the self-reported head, or whether this changes when another
adult becomes the main income earner.









































































Figure 9 shows the proportion of individuals of each age group who are identified
as household heads. This proportion increases steadily over the life cycle for both genders,
but the likelihood of a male being identified as a household head is substantially greater.
About 90% of males above 50 years old are identified as such, while the corresponding
figure for females is only 25-30%. The issue is that these older members are not always the
main income earners in the household, especially for heads older than 40 years old. The
proportion of adult males (females) who are main income earners reaches a peak at about
75% (25%) when they reach approximately that age. (40) At about age 70, though, this
proportion falls to only 45% for males (about 15% for females). Peruvian households, then,23
tend to identify the older male adult as the head of the household, even long after he stops
being the main income earner.
Figure 9. Proportion of Household Heads over the Life Cycle by Gender
























































































This can also be analyzed by looking at the proportion of self-reported heads who
are not the main household earners. Figure 10 indicates that the proportion seems to be flat
at around 15% until age 40 and then increases steadily. One possible explanation for this
feature is that the probability of change in headship increases when the self-reported
head—one of the parents—is less educated than at least one of their children. Even if
differences in labor market experience give earnings advantage to the parent, eventually the
more educated son or daughter may catch up. A somewhat surprising finding, however, is
that there does not seem to be major differences by level of education.24
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The next question is to analyze who are “not the bosses,” or what are the
characteristics of the families in which the family head stops being the main supporter of
the household and in which case the main supporter is one of his/her adult children. Figure
11 shows that the member who becomes the main income earner is always younger than the
self-reported head. Moreover, it is clear that after the self-reported head reaches about 45
years, the age difference between him/her and the main income earner grows further apart,
in particular among male household heads, a pattern that is consistent with those shown in
the three previous figures.
Primary Secondary
Higher25












































 Self-reported heads      Main wage earners
In Table 5, we analyze the characteristics of households where the self-reported
head coincides with the main earner and those in which it does not. In households where
there is no coincidence, the self reported head is more likely to be a woman, older and less
educated than in households where there is coincidence. In those households the alternative
head is younger and more educated. In all the surveys, in households where there is
coincidence of heads, heads are more educated than the self-reported head in households
where there is an alternative head. For instance, in 1997 in the former, 20.7% of heads had
higher education, while in the latter this figure was 16.2%. In households where there is no
coincidence of heads the difference in education between the self-reported head and the
alternative head is much larger than the difference between the head and the second earner
of the household in those households where there is coincidence.
Results not reported show that the proportion of heads who are not main earners
rises throughout the life cycle when the (self-reported) head has primary or secondary26
education, while in the case of post-secondary educated heads the rise seems to start only at
age 50.
Table 5. Characteristics of the Self-reported Head and the Household's Main
Earner (When Different)
Self reported head is...
1985 1991 1994 1997 1985 1991 1994 1997
Self-reported head
  %  o f  m e n 8 58 78 68 8 7 37 37 17 5
  A g e 4 54 54 74 5 5 45 55 65 6
  %  P r i m a r y  e d u c a t i o n 5 74 44 64 1 7 25 85 75 2
  %  S e c o n d a r y  e d u c a t i o n 3 03 73 43 8 1 93 23 13 2
  % Higher education 14 19 20 21 9 10 13 16
  %  S a l a r i e d  w o r k e r s 4 24 33 84 5 2 93 23 53 3
  %  S e l f - e m p l o y e d  w o r k e r s 5 75 66 15 4 6 86 66 36 5
  % Other workers 2 1 1 1 3 2 2 2
Main earner other than self-reported head
  %  o f  m e n 2 82 93 23 0 5 14 45 04 4
  A g e 3 13 23 13 1 3 23 43 43 4
  %  P r i m a r y  e d u c a t i o n 4 52 73 13 1 3 82 72 62 8
  %  S e c o n d a r y  e d u c a t i o n 4 04 64 24 5 4 04 74 24 0
  %  H i g h e r  e d u c a t i o n 1 52 72 72 4 2 22 63 33 2
  %  S a l a r i e d  w o r k e r s 4 14 85 04 3 4 94 95 55 2
  %  S e l f - e m p l o y e d  w o r k e r s 5 75 04 65 4 4 84 84 84 8
  % Other workers 2 2 4 3 3 2 2 2
Household
  % Urban areas 67 69 69 74 74 75 82 83
  S i z e 5555 6665
  # of men 2 2 2 2 3 3 3 3
  # of women 3 2 3 3 3 3 3 3
  # of children [0-6[ 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
  # of children [6-16[ 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
  # of young people [16-25[ 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
  # of adults [25-60[ 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
  # of old people [60-+] 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1
Source: Peru’s Living Standards Measurement Studies Household Surveys 1985, 1991, 1994 & 1997.
* Does not include rural coastal regions and jungle regions.
Main Earner  Not Main Earner
The main earner’s relationship with the self-reported head is shown in Table 9. In
more than half of the cases where the head does not have the highest income, the main
earner is one of his/her children. In around 30% of the cases it is the spouse who has the
household’s highest income. These proportions were basically the same during the last27
years and only the percentage of cases where the main earner is the head’s son/daughter
increased slightly between 1985 and the 1990s.
Table 6. Main Earner’s Relationship with Self-Reported Head 1985-1997
1985 1991 1994 1997
  Spouse 28.0 31.0 27.5 30.5
  Son / Daughter 54.0 51.2 52.8 50.6
  Son in law / Daughter in law 6.6 9.2 8.8 8.3
  Grandchildren 1.8 1.0 2.0 1.4
  Parents / Parents in law 0.5 0.9 0.6 0.9
  Other 8.5 6.6 8.2 7.8
  Non-related 0.7 0.0 0.1 0.4
Source: 1985, 1991, 1994 & 1997 Peruvian LSMS Household Surveys.
*
Summarizing, the main findings in this section are the following. Household size
has decreased significantly for younger Peruvian cohorts with relatively more educated
heads, but this is not true for households with less educated heads. The slight increase in
family size among the less educated seems to be related to differences in the number of
children in the household—a variable related to fertility.  It is not related to differences in
household living arrangements, because we find that the proportion of extended families
has been decreasing for the younger cohorts regardless of educational level. Still, extended
families remain an important feature of family arrangements in Peru over the life cycle, in
particular when the individual is in her early twenties and later as she approaches
retirement. This household strategy affects the meaning of headship, since the self-reported
head stops being the main income earner as he ages. In the following sections, we explore
the possible implications of these adjustments in household structure upon labor market
participation, investments in education and savings.28
6.  Education and Labor Market Performance
6.1 Educational Attainment and Returns to Education
In this section we present estimates of educational attainment by birth cohort, the evolution
of average years of schooling by region and gender and changes in inequality of schooling
attainment. Finally, we present estimates of returns to education, considering differences in
returns across cohorts, age groups and time.
Figures 12 and 13 show the steady progress the country has made in terms of
increasing educational attainment. Only 25% of those born in the 1930s had secondary or
higher education, while half of that cohort had no education or incomplete primary. The
cohort born in the early 1970s, four decades later, is, on the other hand, clearly more
educated: only 20% has primary education or less, while a quarter of the population
belonging to that cohort has secondary education and another quarter some higher
education. Nevertheless, it should be noted that 20% of the youngest adult cohort still has
only 6 or fewer years of schooling. As suggested in Section 3.1, these improvements might
be strongly associated to improvements in education-related public infrastructure and the
important rural-urban migration flows that happened in Peru beginning in the 1950s.




























[-1905] [1926-30] 1935 1940 1945 1950 1955 1960 1965 [1970-
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Birth year
No education Incomplete primary Primary Incomplete secondary Secondary Higher
When looking at gender differences in educational attainment, we find that they
have almost vanished over the period. 40% of females born in the 1930s have no education29
at all, while that figure was just 15% for males. On the other hand, in the youngest
generations, there are almost no uneducated individuals, regardless of their gender. Figure
12 shows that something similar happens for all educational levels.


































































No education Incomplete primary Primary Incomplete secondary Secondary Higher
These changes may also be analyzed using the average number of years of
schooling and the standard deviation of schooling (Figure 14). The average level of
schooling has risen faster for females, and they have indeed almost caught up with their
male counterparts. For the cohort born in the 1970s, the gender gap in schooling years is
less than 0.5 years. On the other hand, the evolution of the dispersion in schooling shows a
clear inverted U-shape for both males and females. Gender differences appear more
persistent in this case, as the standard deviation in schooling years is still much lower for
males. Among males, the turning point was reached earlier, and dispersion started falling
since the cohort born in the 1940s; this turning point was observed a decade later among
females.30
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Female schooling s.d. Male schooling s.d.
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6.2 Labor Force Participation
In this section we analyze age and possible cohorts effects in the recent evolution of labor
force participation (LFP). The most important stylized fact is the clear long-run increase in
LFP among females during the last three decades, rising from 30.5% in 1970 to 34.3% in
1980 and 38.2% in 1990, while for males the figure has been stable, 81.5% 80% and 79.2%
respectively. A look at aggregate trends shows that in the last 12 years, the LFP has moved
in a procyclical fashion.
7 According to the LSMS, data, it fell between 1985 and 1994 and
then increased by 1997. Among males the trough was in the early 1990s, coinciding with
the lowest point of economic activity, immediately after the period of hyperinflation and
the beginning of the Fujimori macroeconomic stabilization program. Using annual surveys
from Metropolitan Lima, these trends are confirmed, as it is possible to show that LFP fell
from the mid-1980s until 1991 in the case of males and until 1993 in the case of females,
increasing thereafter (Saavedra, 1998).
                                                
7 See Saavedra (1998) for an extensive analysis of the procyclicality of LFP.31
Table 7. Basic Labor Market Characteristics
1985 1991 1994 1997 1985 1991 1994 1997 1985 1991 1994 1997
  Employed (in thousands) 2870 3030 3000 3770 3595 4264 4362 4921 6465 7294 7362 8691
  Unemployed 116 140 150 207 112 194 215 246 228 334 365 452
  Inactive 2176 3450 3712 3060 1090 1741 1672 1300 3266 5191 5384 4361
  Labor force particip. rate (%) 57.8 47.9 45.9 56.5 77.3 71.9 73.2 79.9 67.2 59.5 58.9 67.7
  Employment/population ratio 0.56 0.46 0.44 0.54 0.75 0.69 0.70 0.76 0.65 0.57 0.56 0.64
  Unemployment rate (%) 3.9 4.4 4.7 5.2 3.0 4.3 4.7 4.8 3.4 4.4 4.7 4.9
Source: Peru's Living Standards Measurement Studies Household Surveys 1985, 1991, 1994 & 1997.
* Does not include rural coastal regions and jungle regions.
Female Male Total
Figure 15 shows the life cycle pattern of LFP for males and females. As expected,
LFP reaches almost one for men between 35 and 50, and it falls steadily thereafter.
Consistent with human capital investment patterns, LFP rises faster along the life cycle for
less educated males, but reaches higher levels for more educated ones. Among females, the
data reveals a smooth increase until the early forties, after which LFP falls faster than for
men. In the case of college-educated females, although they start participating later, LFP
reaches higher rates than for the other educational levels.
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Urban Self-Employed and Wage Earners
Self-employment is not always a last resort, as is sometimes stated in the literature about
self-employment and the informal sector. As shown in Figure 16, the proportion of self-
employed is very low at early stages of the life cycle and moreover, it increases throughout
the lifetime. By contrast, salaried work decreases since early stages of the career and after
that it falls monotonically. Analysis of informality and self-employment done by Saavedra
and Chong (1999) shows that informal salaried work is the first job for many young
workers, who afterward engage in formal salaried work or in self-employment.
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Proportion of male salaried workers
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Figure 17 shows that at higher levels of education the proportion of young people
working under self-employment is lower. For primary and secondary educated workers the
increase in this proportion follows a slightly increasing trend throughout the life cycle,
while among workers with higher education there is a slight decrease until their forties,
when the curve turns upward sharply. Inverse trends can be seen when the proportion of
salaried workers by educational level is analyzed.33
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6.3 Returns to Education
Finally, we analyzed the life cycle evolution of returns to education and the pattern
observed across cohorts. Using a pseudo panel sample the following regression was
estimated for men and women separately:
                         n n m mj t m mt i m mi j j t t i i m m X A L Y L C L A Y C L y
j          7 6 5 4 3 2 1 0 ln
where y = Real labor income
L = Educational level dummies
C = Cohort dummies
Y = GDP level of the survey year
A = Age dummies (45 dummies)
X = Other control variables (marital status, living area, training, tenure and its
square).
Using the coefficients of the educational dummies and its interactions, we
calculated the life cycle evolution of the educational earnings differentials. It should be
noted that we report educational premia, i.e., the educational earnings differential between a34
specified educational level and the control level—no education. As shown in Figure 18,
returns to higher education among males increase up to 45 years of age and then start
decreasing. Returns to primary and secondary education show a downward trend
throughout the lifetime. Among females, the pattern of returns to higher education is
similar but somewhat more pronounced. The life cycle pattern of returns to primary
education is increasing, while that of secondary education is decreasing.
8
















































































As shown in Figure 19, older cohorts have much higher returns than the younger
ones for all educational levels. Among females, the same decreasing pattern is observed,
except for primary-educated workers, whose returns are constant across cohorts. The
reduction in educational premia for younger cohorts may be related to changes in the
quality of the educational system, but also to the significant increases in educational
attainment reported in Figures 12-14. In a model with imperfect substitution between
individuals with the same level of education who belong to different cohorts, an increase in
the rate of growth of educational attainment leads to a reduction in the returns to education.
9
Actually, the appeal of this story grows when we compare the cohort patterns for different
levels of education. The smaller decreasing trend in the cohort effect for the returns to
                                                
8 It should be noted that the level of the educational earnings differentials shown in the graph is affected by
the mean values of the variables in the regression. Sample averages were held constant for all groups.
9 See, for instance, Card and Lemieux (2000) for the details of a model of that sort.35
college is consistent with the fact that the supply of college-educated individuals has grown
less over the past 4 decades (see Figures 12-13).

























































































































7.  Household Savings
One of the predictions of the life cycle model is that the causal relationship goes from
productivity growth to a higher savings rate. In the simplest version of this model, the
young save while the old dissave. If the income of the young is the same as the income of
the old, savings and dissavings cancel out. With productivity growth, though, the young
will be richer than were their parents at the same age and net savings become positive. The
same is true for population growth. Even with productivity constant, if the young
outnumber the old, net savings will also be positive. In both cases, the faster the growth, the
higher the saving rate.
But this neat implication from the simplest life cycle model is not so clear when the
model is complicated. For instance, concentrating on population growth, if the income path
has a hump shape, young individuals may want to borrow instead of saving early in their
careers. Also, if the individual has three stages in life: childhood, young adulthood and
older adulthood, and children live with their parents, these young adults will tend to borrow
for consumption instead of saving at that point in their lives. Then, it will be not so clear
that aggregate savings will go up under high population growth since the increase in the
ratio of children to young adults could partially compensate for the previous positive effect.36
The demographic transition described in Section 2, and its impact upon household
structure, analyzed in Section 3, makes the evaluation of savings patterns over the life cycle
and across cohorts by Peruvian households particularly appropriate. Under the demographic
transition, the trends of the dependency rates will benefit growth in saving rates. As the
number of working individuals reaching their peaks in income increases faster than the
number of children and old people, the aggregate savings rate will be higher. The
possibility of this window of opportunity opening for a country like Peru raises the
importance of evaluating the empirical validity of the life cycle model in Latin American
economies.
Recent empirical evidence supports the view that household current consumption
and income are highly correlated over the life cycle. (see, for instance, Deaton, 1992). One
of the key factors raised to explain this result is that consumption grows with household
size, which also presents a hump shape over the life cycle (see Figure 3 in Section 6.1).
When controlling for these demographic changes over the life cycle, the savings pattern
recovers the hump shape predicted by the LCH. The issue here is that, as seen in Section
5.2, Peruvian households tend to host extended families as the self-reported head ages,
including other younger income earners. In this context, we need to evaluate the effect of
these household strategies on the life cycle pattern of household income, since the previous
argument also relies on household income having a hump shape over the life cycle.
In this section, we analyze the patterns of household savings over the life cycle and
across cohorts. Households are identified according to the age of the household head, and
we take into account the important changes that occur within the household over the life
cycle in terms of the number of income-generating members. In particular, we analyze
household savings, as measured by  y s c y s / ln ln ~    .
10 Figure 20 displays the age-
cohort averages for this measure of household savings, by level of education of the self-
reported household head.
11 These averages do not show any clear pattern over the life cycle,
                                                
10 Household consumption excludes expenditures in durables, education and health. See Appendix A for
details on the construction of the series for household income and consumption.
11 As indicated in Section 3, we drop from the sample households whose heads are younger than 20 years old
or older than 79 at the moment of the interview. Pooling all households together would generate biases if they
differ not only on their income levels but also on their life cycle paths (see Attanasio and Székely, 1998)37
except for households with more educated heads (more than 11 years of schooling) for
whom a clear decreasing trend is observed.
Since the year effect cannot be considered negligible a priori for savings, these plots
do not help us much to capture the age and cohort effects. Figure 21 presents the age and
cohort effects estimated by running the regression in expression (7) for each level of
education.
12 Cohort effects appear very flat for households with less educated heads, but
become decreasing when we switch to the more educated ones indicating that older
educated cohorts tend to save substantially less than their younger counterparts. Indeed,
households whose heads were about 60 years old in 1985 save about 40 points less than
those that were about 20 that same year. This result is actually fairly consistent with
previous findings for other Latin American countries such as Mexico (see Attanasio and
Székely, 1998, Figure 14), and also indicate that some long-term changes seem to have
affected educated households more.
Figure 20. Log Savings over the Life Cycle
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12 As indicated in Section 3, we do allow for the year effects to be different for households living urban and
rural “centros poblados.” Appendix B presents the estimated age and cohort profiles when using the
traditional identification strategy described for the estimation of expression (2) in Section 3.2.38
The estimated age effects do not show a monotone pattern, but a rather inclined J
shape at least until heads become sixty, when it becomes flat. Indeed, the peak in the
savings rate is around that age for less educated heads, although it seems to be 65 for heads
with some college education. The bottom is reached at about 35 years for the less educated
household heads but at 25 for heads with some college education. Also, the savings rate at
the peak is only 10 or 15 points higher than at the beginning of the life cycle but 25-30
points higher than at the bottom. These age effects do not match with the predictions of the
simplest life cycle theory, that is, we do not observe a hump shape over the life cycle of
savings by Peruvian households. The strong decreasing trend early in the life cycle seems
to be generated by consumption pressures, probably as a result of the increases in the size
of the household. The non-decreasing pattern of household savings as the head reaches
his/her retirement years might indicate that a bequest motive is important to explain savings
by Peruvian households.
Figure 21. Total Savings Rate—Age and Cohort Effects by Level of Education
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Still, these implications need to be taken with care since the definition of savings
used here might not be the appropriate one for Peruvian households as a result of the family
arrangements that these households generate to overcome the lack of formal pension
arrangements. We have seen in section V that the number of income generating members in
the household increases with the age of the self-reported household head. (Figure 8) The
incorporation of other income earners could potentially affect the shape of the household
income pattern over the life cycle. Moreover, the fact that these additional income earners
become the household´s main source of income and that they are increasingly younger
(Figure 11) could affect the way the decisions are taken within the household.
Another related issue is that the inclusion of net transfers from relatives and friends
in the construction of household income might be over-estimating savings, especially late
in the life cycle. Figure 22 shows the life cycle pattern for this variable as a proportion of
household income. These transfers show a relative flat pattern until the head reaches about
50 years old, but after that they increase sharply to become up to 25% of household income.
These two family arrangements need to be considered carefully before stating any
conclusions.40
Figure 22. Net Transfers over the Life Cycle
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To evaluate the role of these family arrangements on the age effects for Peruvian
household savings, we compare three differently estimated age profiles over the life cycle
for the household savings rate (Figure 23). The first is the unadjusted-undiscounted age
profile for  1 s  already shown in Figure 20, which includes net transfers from relatives and
friends as income. The second profile is obtained from  c y s ln ˆ ln 2   , where  y ˆ denotes the
discounted household income (net of transfers). Finally, the third age profile  3 s  is also
obtained from  2 s , but demographic controls are included in the associated regression (7).
13
                                                
13 The results in Figure 23 include household size, the proportion of children and elders as demographic
controls. We also tried including an indicator variable for households with extended families, and other
alternatives, obtaining basically the same results.41
Figure 23. Age Profiles for Total, Discounted (Net of Transfers) and
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The comparison is quite interesting. It shows that family arrangements are quite
important as an strategy to smooth income over the life cycle among Peruvian households.
The effects of those strategies differ across levels of education, though. In the case of the
less educated heads (educ=0), both types of arrangements seem to become important only
after the head reaches about 35 years old. From then on, savings do present a hump shape
when we omit transfers from income  2 s  with a sharp decline after the head reaches 60
years of age. The inclusion of demographic controls, though, generates a declining pattern
for savings over all the life cycle.
The effects are quite different for households with more educated heads. In the case
of heads with some secondary education (educ=1), only adjustments in household structure
seem to be important and generate a flat pattern over the life cycle. For household heads
with some college education, only transfers from relatives and friends seem to play an
important role for savings, especially in the early stages of the life cycle. When omitting
transfers from income, we find a sharp increase in savings from the beginning, although no42
major drop in savings appear as he/she approaches retirement years. But this last finding
needs to be taken with care, considering the limitations of the sample size for this group,
especially as the head reaches the retirement years. (see Table 1 in Section 4)
The differences observed in Figure 23 suggest the importance of household
demographics and transfers from relatives over the age pattern for household savings. The
relative importance of each of these effects varies across educational groups. The
adjustment in income—the exclusion of transfers—only generates the expected hump shape
pattern for savings in the case of households with more educated heads. One possible
explanation is that there are further income-related adjustments.
One way to indicate the importance of the latter is to compare household total
income with the household labor income and the labor income of the head. Figure 24 shows
the estimated age patterns for these three income variables, obtained using the log of GDP
to identify the year effects, as before. First, we notice that total household income presents
no significant age patterns. On the other hand, the labor income of the head does show a
clear hump shape for households with more educated heads, with the peak reached at about
forty years old. The age pattern for heads with less than primary education is strictly
increasing until age sixty and remains constant after that. Another clear point is that the
differences between these three income variables increase with the age of the household
head, regardless of their level of education. It is relatively clear, then, that Peruvian
households use several family arrangements over the life cycle and that they affect income
patterns over the life cycle. Indeed, these arrangements eliminate any age patterns for total
household income, regardless of the educational level of the head.
In conclusion, age patterns of savings by Peruvian households are partially
consistent with the implications of a life cycle model when we take into consideration
family arrangements, especially for those with more educated heads. For households with
less educated heads, the flatness of the age pattern of savings may be related to the fact that
families have flat income patterns over the life cycle. In other words, Peruvian households
do smooth consumption over the life cycle, not only by the typical saving-dissaving
mechanism, but also by smoothing household income.43
Figure 24. Age Effects for Total Income, Labor Income and Income of the
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We ought to model the decisions on the adjustments in household structure, and its
effect upon savings, before we can state a more definitive answer in this regard. That is, we
need to understand the factors household members consider when they decide to
incorporate or retain adults, what makes an elderly parent join the household of her
offspring, and which of them is the one that shares the household with their parents, and
who is only bounded to remit. An alternative research agenda would go in the direction of
Deaton and Paxson (1998), who obtain individual savings profiles and compare them with
the ones of the household.
Disentangling these issues, for each educational level of the head, would very likely
be an important step towards understanding the household decision to save, and to
determine the potential impact of the demographic transition on aggregate savings. The
results presented here would clearly indicate that we need to look not only at consumption
adjustments as a result of demographic changes, but also at the income smoothing44
implications of the family arrangements that Peruvian households implement over the life
cycle.
7.   Summary and Final Remarks
Demographic changes in Peru have been slightly faster than the Latin American average.
The Peruvian population is already aging, with youth dependency ratios falling and elderly
dependency ratios already slightly increasing. These changes are very promising in the
sense that they improve the ability of the Peruvian economy to take proper care of children
and the elderly.  Nevertheless, the differences in these achievements by level of education,
reported in this study, raise important policy concerns relating the future trends of income
distribution in Peru.
Household size has decreased significantly for younger Peruvian cohorts with
relatively more educated heads, but this is not true for households with less educated heads.
The slight increase in family size among the less educated seems to be related to
differences in the number of children in the household. The connection of this variable with
fertility would suggest an important role for family planning programs among the poor.
The previous result is not related to differences in household strategies since we
find no significant differences in the proportion of extended families by educational level of
the head. Indeed, this proportion has been decreasing for the younger cohorts for all
household types. Still, junctions with relatives remain an important feature of family
arrangements in Peru over the life cycle, in particular when the individual is in her early
twenties and later as she approaches retirement. This household strategy affects the
meaning of headship, since the self-reported head stops being the main income earner as
he/she ages.
An analysis of educational attainment across cohorts shows that younger cohorts are
clearly more educated, and gender differences have decreased substantially. Still, 20% of
individuals belonging to the cohort born in the 1970s have not gone further than primary
education. Also, the variance in schooling years remains high, in particular for younger
female cohorts. Returns to education are lower for the younger cohorts. This may be related
to changes in the quality of the educational system, and/or to the significant increases in45
educational attainment achieved in the past decades. Normally, the increase in the relative
supply of educated workers effect is partially offset by economic growth, as that generates
an increase in relative demand. In that sense, the observed decreasing trend would indicate
that supply pressures have dominated over the past fifty years.
Finally, the analysis of household savings patterns across the life cycle shows that
family arrangements by Peruvian households affect income patterns over the life cycle. We
argue that Peruvian households do smooth consumption over the life cycle, but not only by
the typical saving-dissaving mechanism, but also by smoothing household income. Under
these circumstances, it is not easy to predict the implications of the demographic transition
on aggregate savings in Peru. If anything, these initial findings on the savings age and
cohort profiles stress the importance of additional research on the decisions on household
structure over the life cycle in Peru. Another important issue is that the optimality of this
income smoothing by Peruvian households over the life cycle may be related to the lack of
development in Peruvian long-run capital markets. Again, we need to understand better this
connection before trying to understand the potential effects of reforms in the pension
system.46
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Appendix A
The operational definition of income is based on net labor income, including in-kind
payments, property rents, capital gains plus other non-labor income. We tried to include
contributions to a pension system as income, but unfortunately, the PLSMS does not allow
for the identification of such a variable. On the other hand, we did exclude pension
payments because we wanted it to appear as negative saving for retired individuals or their
relatives.
The operational definition for consumption is based on the expenditures on non-
durables. The Instituto Cuánto identifies 9 groups of expenditures for the PLSM surveys:
Group 1: food, beverages and tobacco
Group 2: Clothing
Group 3: Household rent, payments and utilities
Group 4: Furniture and other household expenses
Group 5: Health
Group 6: Transportation and communications
Group 7: Education, entertainment and culture
Group 8: Net transfers
Group 9: Other
We constructed a different aggregate by excluding several sub-categories because
they correspond to expenditures on durables. In particular, we excluded household rent and
payments from Group 3. Household payments correspond to the purchase of the home, so it
is definitely a durable. We also excluded rents since the collected information had several
inconsistencies across survey runs.
14 We also excluded furniture from Group 4, education
from Group 7 and all health expenditures (Group 7). Education and health expenditures
were excluded because they are considered investments in human capital.
15
                                                
14 In 1985, homeowners were asked about the estimated rent they would charge for somebody else to live in
their house. After that, the question changed to the estimated rent they think they would have to pay had they
not owned the house.
15 As life cycle investments, expenditures in education and health have a strong pattern over the life cycle.
That is, expenditures in education are higher when the household head is relatively young and has school-age
children (Figure 4). In the case of health, also, it is known that households tend to spend more on health while50
Figure 2 plots year-decile averages for log income (linc), and log of consumption
(eg), as defined here, as well as two alternative expenditure aggregates on the year of the
survey. g denotes the cohort averages for the total expenditures reported by Instituto Cuánto
and fg denotes an aggregate that adds health and education expenditures to consumption
(eg). The patterns across years for the two measures of expenditures and our measure of
consumption do not seem to vary much, especially those of eg and fg. A somewhat
puzzling feature is that household income seems to be less sensitive than expenditures to
the crisis between 1985 and 1994, especially for households in the lower bottom of the
distribution.
 linc g
















Figure A.1. Log Income, Log Expenditures and Log Consumption over the
Years, by Level of Education
                                                                                                                                                    
they have children younger than 5 years old. This would also be the time when expenditures on health would
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Figure B.2. Log Consumption over the Life Cycle52
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